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ABSTRACT
In connection with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, contact tracing mobile
applications (e.g., that leverage Wi-Fi and Bluetooth™ Low Energy (BLE)) are being
deployed. Many of those applications are susceptible to different security attacks. To
address those types of challenges, techniques are presented herein that provide a multitiered mechanism for an optimized genuine client neighbor filtering technique that, among
other things, may detect, score, and filter fake BLE advertisement attacks to improve the
efficacy of the overall contact tracing application ecosystem and reduce airtime utilization
from fake advertisements in the industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) frequency bands.
For example, a man-in-the-middle (MITM) or other adversary may attach a mobile device
to a carrier (such as a dog, car, flying drone, etc.) that advertises proximity identifiers to
the devices of unsuspecting people. Additionally, the presented techniques address device
power and storage drain that are associated with denial-of-service attacks involving a large
volume of messages.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
As a part of ongoing COVID-19 pandemic many contact tracing mobile
applications using a Wi-Fi and BLE ecosystem are appearing in the market place.
Although different vendors are jointly working towards an application programming
interface (API) and BLE service-based advertisement mechanism, there are different
security attacks which can occur. Such attacks are formulated to use intricate settings to
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avoid privacy concerns and when a user chooses to bypass such a privacy intrusion the
security threat actor can create a de-anonymization attack.
Tracking and de-anonymization attacks are intended to violate privacy. Such
attacks in one case rely on false positive alert injections and offer other security mitigation
strategies. Although research has shown how false alert injections may be mitigated by
correlation techniques, it is still possible to create such a security attack in the BLE beacon
framework. The existing mitigation techniques rely on client-side power boosting or
increasing the signal strength or the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) which eventually will drain
the battery life of a client and as such are not a scalable idea. Aspects of the techniques
presented herein leverage a BLE-enabled API or gateway and Wi-Fi infrastructure-based
solution to address such challenges. Aspects of the techniques presented herein support a
multi-tiered security solution strategy that, among other things, mitigates client power drain
and detects trolling (e.g., a trolling dog, a drone flying, etc.) security attacks before a
vendor’s API-based BLE advertisement beacon is genuinely triggered for a COVID-19
contact tracing use case.
The asynchronous change of a Bluetooth device address (BD_ADDR) and a
Rolling Proximity Identifier (RPI) in the GAEN exposure notification system are causing
this security vulnerability issue as the attacker can use this ‘asynchronous behavior’ to
manipulate the next RPI value, which is supposed to be secured, and with this they can
either (i) create false positive-based security attacks to skew the COVID-19 positive
numbers or (ii) keep a track of person thus intruding upon their privacy.
For example, the timing of a BD_ADDR and a 16 byte RPI is very critical for every
15 minute rolling duration to detect these security attacks and hence the BLE time-based
fingerprinting with a rolling table (as described below) is important for a network manager
vendor’s business value to enable a cleaner application ecosystem with different
technology partners.
It is important to note that such attacks are not unique to COVID-19. However, the
recent attention given to contact tracing security and privacy risks highlight the
significance of the techniques presented herein. It will be apparent that various of the
techniques presented herein may be applied to other generic security attacks which use a
similar RPI-like framework.
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These two problems are avoided through the use of aspects of the techniques
presented herein, thus providing for the ability to build applications and analytic
dashboards for a COVID-19 contact tracing framework. In particular, aspects of the
techniques presented herein support, among other things, cleaner (e.g., verified and
validated data about COVID-19 positive exposure) data being provided by a network
manager vendor, enhanced false positive-based security threat detection feature in rolling
time slots with keys stored in a cloud data store, etc.
For purposes of clarity, in the narrative that follows RPI will refer to a 16 byte value
as described in an exposure notification framework. If a fake BLE advertiser (like, for
example, a trolling dog or a flying drone) continuously emits spoofed BLE advertisements
to create more false positive-based security attacks in a COVID-19 exposure notification
framework as described above (e.g., trolling attack by dogs or drones, intentional power
drain attack, etc.) then the BLE API on the other end can automatically filter such fake
false positives by employing aspects of the techniques presented herein and would be able
to capture and filter such a security threat in, for example, a smart city-based Internet-ofthings (IoT) deployment or an enterprise deployment.
Figure 1, below, depicts aspects of the detection and filtering of security attacks
with a network manager in a COVID-19-based contact tracing framework.
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Figure 1: Detecting and Filtering Security Attacks in a Contact Tracing Framework
Based on the numerical correlation analysis of a past BD_ADDR, a present
BD_ADDR, and the timing correlation analysis of an RPI and a BD_ADDR for every 15
minutes (as described below) the BLE service can decide if a unique rolling key for contact
tracking should be generated for a device (as shown in Figure 1, above) and stored in a
local application. This same key is used for a BLE beacon-based advertisement and
eventually stored in a cloud data store for historical analysis at a later point in time (as
shown in Figure 2, below).
In any BLE advertisement the advertising data refers to the (0 to 31 byte) long
payload that is available for application use. In the Bluetooth Core specification this field
is referred to as AdvData. Aspects of the techniques presented herein may conduct a deep
inspection of the AD Field (0x1A) which refers to the advertising interval (see, for example,
the Bluetooth Core Specification: Core Specification Supplement, Part A, section 1.15)
from the received BLE Advertisement beacon messages.
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BLE tags and devices transmit advertising packets on a selectable interval that is as
short as 20 milliseconds (ms) or as long as several minutes. The same advertisement packet
is sent on all three of the advertising channels (37, 38, and 39) every time that a device
advertises, making it more likely that any receiver or scanner will pick it up. A user's
presence state from a mobile application is embedded in a 16 byte proximity-based
universally unique identifier (UUID).
Based on the received UUID, rolling proximity identifier, sender media access
control (MAC) address, and advertising interval consecutively in every channel (37, 38,
and 39), a table may be created. Figure 2a, below, depicts aspects of an illustrative
fingerprint table comprising, among other things, a BLE advertisement timer, a UUID, and
an RPI-based rolling index.

Figure 2a: Illustrative Fingerprint Table
If there is a fake BLE advertisement with a spoofed UUID and sender’s address to
match with the original along with a rolling proximity identifier, then the variations in the
BLE Adv_Interval that are captured from multiple readers (e.g., various access points
(Aps), Alice and Bob's smartphone, etc.) can be collated by the cloud backend service to
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compare the Adv_Pattern by creating a Table (e.g., a "timer based BLE advertisement
anomaly detection table").
Since a genuine BLE Beacon will have a standard Adv_Interval rotation technique
(between 20 ms and one minute), with multiple input data collected about both genuine
UUIDs and fake UUIDs (from, for example, Alice, Bob, neighboring Aps, etc.) it is easier
to predict a fake BLE beacon.
As shown in Figure 2a, above, and in Figure 2b, below, if a fake BLE UUID is
detected by the in sync and out of sync "timer based BLE advertisement anomaly detection
table" in the cloud backend, then a Simple Objects Access Protocol (SOAP) API-based
alert may be triggered to a contact tracing application that is running on a smartphone to
stop deriving the rolling proximity identifier from the unique contact tracing key for that
particular time duration. This would ensure that an anomalous trigger of a false positive
(e.g., COVID-19 positive) based proximity BLE advertisement alert would prevent the
triggering of a rolling identifier to be saved (with incorrect information) in the cloud data
store.

Figure 2b: Illustrative Fingerprint Table
Under aspects of the techniques presented herein the creation of a 15 minute timerbased BLE advertisement map or table to analyze anomalies that are based on various
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attributes (such as, for example, UUID, Adv_Interval, sender address, BLE MAC address,
rolling proximity identifier, etc.) is of particular note.
Aspects of the techniques presented herein leverage the BLE 5.0 specification’s
advertisement interval to derive a "time synchronized BLE beacons received table or list "
by a neighboring Client (e.g., Bob as one example). If there is a timing variation in a BLE
advertisement that is received by a neighboring client at time 't' as opposed to what is
defined in the ‘time synchronized BLE beacon advertisement map’ then such a BLE
advertisement can be ignored for contact tracing packet flow (as described above) and the
unique RPI that was received in the BLE advertisement would be ignored (not saved) by
the neighboring BLE smartphone client (e.g., a local application). The unique rolling key
packet identifier would not be stored in the cloud data store backend for contact tracing
based on people's exposure data (e.g., a 14 to 15 day period).
BLE beacons that are advertised or received by any client are compared with its
own ‘advertisement timing schedule template’ from other neighboring BLE beacons or
elsewhere (e.g., a Wi-Fi AP and a BLE AP/IoT gateway, etc.). Only the BLE beacons that
match the template that is described below will be honored, all others would be ignored.
The template may be:
1) Only the BLE beacons that are advertised with a unique rolling key for contact
tracing and which match the timing and numerical correlation analysis of
BD_ADDR and RPI as depicted above.
2) Only the BLE beacons which are received and which match the BLE timing
schedule or template that is stored by the client. Such a BLE advertisement
time map or template may be shared through a representational state transfer
(REST) API to a cloud-based backend service to store such table data and
exchange it with other clients. Different cloud service vendors have existing
API services to consume such data coming in from the client ecosystems and
backend application.
For example, a smartphone client may use a length/type/data field in the
smartphone operating system to accomplish this by giving a contact tracing application the
possibility to ‘subscribe’ to a particular UUID and receive a notification if an advertiser
with that UUID appears in close proximity. Through aspects of the techniques presented
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herein, by inspecting the advertised data during a multitier validation, one can ensure that
the false positives and troll-like BLE advertisement security attacks are nullified in a real
time public Wi-Fi and BLE environment (such as, for example, a smart city or an
enterprise).
Under aspects of the techniques presented herein, the table comparison triggering
the packet workflow from a cloud backend to a BLE client Infra via a vendor's AP or IoT
gateway is of particular note. Unlike an enterprise rogue context, in a public WIFI or BLE
IoT deployment its practically impossible to physically identify and remove such rogue
threat actors like stray dogs or drones with equipment that is tagged trying to create a
security attack. Under aspects of the techniques presented herein, taking an adaptive, datadriven decision on when to generate and store the rolling key identifier and when to pause
or ignore the generation, filtering, and saving of a rolling key identifier or RPI for a specific
duration when the attack vector is in proximity is of particular node.
By avoiding such troll and battery drain attacks from a Wi-Fi or BLE client
smartphone, battery power is improved as the BLE reader backend service in the mobile
application will use the data-driven logic that was described above to ignore the fake BLE
UUID advertisements which are meant to create false positives.
Figure 3a, below, depicts elements of a BLE timing-based ‘pebble’ attack.

Figure 3a: Illustrative BLE Timing-Based ‘Pebble’ Attack
Figure 3b, below, continues from Figure 3a, above, and depicts elements of an
asynchronous BLE ‘pebble’ message security attack.
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Figure 3b: Illustrative Asynchronous BLE ‘Pebble’ Message Security Attack
As described above, the prediction of an RPI based on correlation techniques is a
security threat as it can be used to create spoof attacks to skew a COVID-19 positive rate
in a geofenced region. Hence there is a need for a filtering mechanism within the 15 minute
time slot as provided through aspects of the techniques presented herein.
Figure 3c, below, continues from Figures 3a and 3b, above, and depicts further
elements of an attack.

Figure 3c: Illustrative BLE Attack
Figure 4, below, presents a network manager-based analytics workflow for a
security threat detection and filtering mechanism.
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Figure 4: Exemplary Threat Detection and Filtering Workflow
A BLE security attack of the type that was described above can be done for a
maximum time period of 15 minutes as per the BLE 5.0 specification and an exposure
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notification framework. Even though a BLE message is encrypted with a temporal rotation,
the increase in speed of this rotation would not solve the ‘detection of BLE security attack’
problem. The security threat is more towards the manipulation of an RPI (16 byte value)
based on the ‘pebble BLE BD_ADDR’ and a past BD_ADDR. This security attack should
be addressed as it is a privacy violation and can skew up COVID-19 positive numbers
globally in existing exposure notification frameworks for COVID-19 applications.
In connection with the techniques presented herein, of particular interest and note
in the descriptions and the figures that were presented in the above narrative are, for
example:
1) The identification of a BD_ADDR source of a spoofed or manipulated BLE
advertisement with the proposed technique. The identification of a source is
important as the unique rolling keys and RPI corresponding to that source can
then be ignored and not saved in a cloud data store.
2) The creation of a BLE advertisement timer and an RPI-based fingerprinting
table or database are important in order to address the security issues that were
described above (see, for example, Figures 2a and 2b, above, and Figure 5,
below).
3) The identification of which ‘exact time duration’ in a 15 minute slot of a BLE
advertisement is spoofed in, for example, a 24/7 smart city public Wi-Fi and
BLE AP infrastructure deployment (as the unique rolling key derived in that 15
minute slot can then be ignored as described above).
4) The identification of the unique rolling key that is received from the list of BLE
beacons as seen by the smartphone (of, for example, Alice and Bob) and
deciding which unique rolling key is a genuine COVID-19 positive and which
unique rolling key is a false positive. The specific key that is identified
important as that value is ignored and need not be stored in a cloud list. All of
the other clients in the vicinity who are downloading the list from a cloud server
would thus have genuine COVID-19 positive exposure data only. In this way,
security attacks creating false positives are avoided in a BLE-based contact
tracing framework.
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5) The derivation of a risk score based on the number of RPI inconsistencies seen
within the 15 minute time slot with machine learning (ML) based techniques is
valuable to network manager vendor’s business as any application partners
would be interested to parse the "risk score profiled data" to decide on how to
use a REST API-exposed data store for creating a dashboard application for a
COVID-19 positive contact tracing framework. For the sake of simplicity,
under aspects of the techniques presented herein the risk score may be increased
by one if one RPI inconsistency is seen and then in steps of one for a 15 minute
time slot. Alternatively, a network manager may sample this risk score counter
value every 15 minutes to decide which particular RPI key should be stored in
a cloud data store which is eventually exposed to different application data
partners who, for example, build applications and dashboards on COVID-19
analytics. Such a derived risk score based on the sampling and cleaning of BLE
data to remove the security attack-based data sample from incoming a
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) payload into a network manager is of
particular importance. It is important to note that other risk scoring models may
also be considered in connection with a network manager vendor’s analytics.
6) The removal (after a spoofed BLE entry in every 15 minute sample is identified
based on fingerprinting analysis, as described above) of the corresponding
anomalous ‘key – rolling key’ entry from the table and so the anomalous unique
contact tracing key is not stored in the final list in the cloud data store. (An
illustrative packet flow is described below.) When the final list of COVID-19
positive exposure-based keys is automatically downloaded by other clients in
the vicinity, the automatic false positive notifications of a COVID-19 positive
exposure is nullified, thereby avoiding a panic situation.
For purposes of illustration, consider a hypothetical packet flow involving a WiFi/BLE AP, sensor, or BLE beacon can include rolling table creation, computation, and out
of sync anomaly detection based on data analytics, as generally illustrated via Figure 5,
below. Using an NBAPI or RESTAPI, information is provided to a cloud application server
and a filtered list of genuine ‘rolling key’ entries alone are present in time-based tables in
a cloud data store.

Thereafter, time based rolling keys are downloaded by partner
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smartphone client application on a periodic basis to facilitate COVID-19 positive exposure
validation.
Detection, Filtering, and Risk Score Profiling

Application
Server

Network
Management
NBAPI/RESTAPI

Websockets/Https
Network
Management
Connector
Netconf/TDL

gRPC

Controller

CAPWAP

AP

BLE beacon tags

AP

Figure 5: Example Flow
Any security attacks based on false positives are nullified using the BLE
fingerprinting and risk score-based filtering mechanisms as encompassed under various of
the techniques that are presented herein.
It is important to note that the processing of the raw payload will be used to
determine if the BLE beacon that is seen in the contract tracing application in genuine. It
is also important to note that the time-based BLE advertisement fingerprinting approach in
a rolling slot basis with the unique rolling key identifier as the primary key for a table
provides for quick indexing to filter any outliers (e.g., false positive data).
Figure 6, below, presents aspects of a 15 minute rolling time slotted window-based
filtering mechanism of received BLE advertisement messages.
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Figure 6: Exemplary Rolling Time Slotted Filtering Mechanism
In connection with aspects of the techniques presented herein, it is also important
to note that it is not necessary to observe a ‘static UUID’ in any neighborhood (e.g., an
airport or other environments) for some specific amount of time (e.g., 45 minutes). Rather,
from a randomized set of UUIDs that are seen it is possible to identify which UUID is
spoofed based on a ‘numerical and timing correlation analysis’ as described above in a 15
minute slot of rolling interval to ‘filter’ the specific spoofed UUID corresponding to an
RPI entry from the table from which it is derived (e.g., by doing a reverse lookup).
As described and illustrated in the narrative above, the techniques that are presented
herein offer a number of valuable capabilities, including:
1) Detection methods. As depicted in, for example, Figures 2, 3, and 4 (all above)
a numerical correlation analysis of RPI values and BD_ADDR values (both old
and new) for every 15 minute duration to identify the presence of a spoofed
attack entry of UUID. Additionally, a timing synchronization check between a
RPI and a BD_ADDR to identify the security attack or spoof in every 15 minute
slot over a duration of 45 mins (e.g., out of sync as depicted in Figure 2b, above).
2) Filtering methods. As depicted in, for example, Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 (all above)
an RPI entry that is found (according to the techniques that were described
above) is filtered so that it is not stored in the cloud application data store for
14 days. A network manager’s filtering of such detected RPI key for every 15
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minutes in the JSON data that is exposed via a Northbound API (NBAPI) is
important as an RPI value is the unique entry used by the exposure notification
framework for contact tracing. As depicted in Figure 5, above, a time-based
BLE advertisement fingerprinting approach in a rolling slot basis for every 15
minutes with the unique rolling key identifier as the primary key for the table
allows for quick indexing to filter the outlier data (e.g., false positive data).
3) Risk score profiling. As depicted in, for example, Figures 2, 3, and 4 (all above)
deriving a risk score based on the number of RPI inconsistencies that are seen
within a 15 minute time slot using ML-based techniques is important and
valuable to a network manager vendor’s business as any application partners
are interested to parse this derived ‘Risk score profiled data’ to decide on how
to use an exposed REST API for creating a dashboard application for COVID19 positive infections with the network manager as a part of a COVID-19
contact tracing framework. Existing partners and customers are interested in
such cleansed BLE data. The derived risk score profiling can be appended to
the JSON data that is exposed to a customer through, for example, NBAPI or a
REST API for consumption by application partners.
In summary, techniques have been presented that provide a multi-tiered mechanism
for an optimized genuine client neighbor filtering technique that, among other things, may
detect, score, and filter fake BLE advertisement attacks to improve the efficacy of the
overall contact tracing application ecosystem and also to reduce airtime utilization from
fake advertisements in the ISM frequency bands. For example, a MITM or other adversary
that attaches a mobile device to a carrier (such as a dog, car, flying drone, etc.) that
advertises proximity identifiers to the devices of unsuspecting people as part of a network
security attack by leveraging a BLE based application ecosystem of a COVID-19 contact
tracing framework can be addressed using techniques as described herein. Additionally,
the presented techniques address device power and storage drain that are associated with
denial-of-service attacks involving a large volume of messages.
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